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Surviving Judicial Activism in the Tenth 
Circuit: An Analysis of 
Berry v. City of Muskogee 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is a well established legal principle that a court of law 
must have authority in order to adjudicate a particular action. 1 
A court's authority to adjudicate an issue is non-existent if a 
party does not have standing to sue.2 A deceased person did 
not have standing to sue at common law.3 Today, state stat-
utes goveming the survival of actions and the parties who may 
bring those actions provide standing to sue and mitigate the 
harsh common law rule that a person's cause of action always 
terminated upon death.4 To decide whether or not a civil rights 
claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 19835 survives, federal law 
provides that courts apply the state law wherein the claim was 
brought.6 
The Tenth Circuit addressed the survivability and damages 
applicable when a § 1983 civil rights claim is alleged in Berry 
v. City of Muskogee7• This note will analyze the Berry decision 
and compare the Tenth Circuit approach to the survivability of 
§ 1983 claims with that of other jurisdictions and the Supreme 
L FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1); see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 
2. New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1346-47 (2d 
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 49fi U.S. 947 (1990). 
:1. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 69a, 702 n.14, reh'g denied, 412 U.S. 
963 (1973). 
4. ld.; see Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. fi84, fi89 (1978); Cunningham v. 
Ray, 648 F.2d 118fi, 1186 (8th Cir. 1981). 
fi. Section 1988 states, 
"[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress .... " 
42 U.S.C. § 198:3 (1984). 
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. For cases applying state law under § 1988, see infra n.16 
and accompanying text. 
7. 900 F.2d 1489 (lOth Cir. 1990). 
83 
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Court. Part II of this note will provide a review of the Tenth 
Circuit's decision in Berry. Part III will survey other decisions 
regarding the survivability of§ 1983 actions. Part IV will com-
pare the Tenth Circuit's decision in Berry with the decisions 
surveyed in part III. This note concludes that the Tenth 
Circuit's Berry decision contradicts federal law and Supreme 
Court precedent and therefore should be overturned. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Mark Berry was a prisoner in the Muskogee City Federal 
jail. While in prison, fellow inmates murdered Berry. In Berry 
v. City of Muskogee, Berry's widow brought a§ 1983 civil rights 
action against the City of Muskogee in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma.8 At trial the 
defendant, City of Muskogee, objected to an application of 
Oklahoma's wrongful death statute as the proper source of 
authority for an award of damages. 9 The trial court overruled 
this objection and used the damages available under 
Oklahoma's wrongful death statute to instruct the jury. 10 
Judgment was entered against the City and the City appealed 
claiming, inter alia, that the measure of damages should be 
calculated according to Oklahoma's survival statute pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.n 
In considering which statutory measure of damages was 
appropriate, the Tenth Circuit had to decide two things: 1) 
whether this was a survival or wrongful death action, and 2) 
whether the damages should be based on a state survival stat-
ute, wrongful death statute, or "whether damages are deter-
mined by some federal standard either as a survival or wrong-
ful death-type action not defined or limited by state law."12 
In deciding these two issues, the Tenth Circuit acknowl-
edged that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 contains a three step process for 
resolving areas of ambiguity or deficiency in the civil rights 
statutes.13 First, § 198814 directs courts to look at the federal 
H. !d. at 1506. 
9. !d. at 1500. 
10. [d. 
11. !d. 
12. !d. at 1501. 
1a. Id. at 1502. 
14. Section l9RR provides in pertinent part, 
"in all cases where the [federal law] is not adapted to the object, or are 
deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies . . . the 
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law; second, if the federal law is "deficient," the courts are to 
apply the law of the state where the claim is brought; and 
third, the courts are to reject the state law if it is "inconsistent 
with the Constitution and laws of the United States."15 
Applying the first step of § 1988, the Tenth Circuit looked 
to the federal law and concluded that this was a survival ac-
tion. 16 The court reasoned that § 1983 states that liability is 
"to the party injured."17 The deceased is the injured party and 
therefore, the person who has the cause of action. 18 
The Tenth Circuit then turned its attention to the issue of 
which statutory authority for an award of damages should 
apply. The court concluded that "Congress envisioned a signifi-
cant remedy for wrongful killings resulting from conduct pro-
scribed by § 1983 but did not provide specific guidance regard-
ing whether that would be realized under a federal law or state 
survival action or by other means."19 Thus, following § 1988's 
second step, the court tumed to the Oklahoma statute regard-
ing survival actions and decided this statute contradicted feder-
al law. 2° Federal law is contradicted when the direct language 
of the Constitution or federal statute is impeded or when the 
purpose of the federal law is undermined.21 The purposes of§ 
1983 are the prevention of abuses of power by those acting 
under color of state law and compensation of persons injured by 
deprivation of federal rights.22 The court held that applying 
the Oklahoma survival statute would "provide extraordinarily 
common law, as modified by the constitution and statutes of the state 
wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is 
held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and 
lawR of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said 
courts in the trial and disposition of the cause .... " 
42 U.S.C. § 19RH (19R4). 
lfi. ld.; see also Robertson v. Wegmann, 4;~6 U.S. 584, 590-591 (197H); Berry, 
900 F.2d at 1504-1507 (lOth Cir. 1990); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 864 F.2d 734, 
7aH (11th Cir. 19H9), reh/{ denied, 871 F.2d 122 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 
U.S. 817, appeal after remand, 931 F.2d 811 (11th Cir. 1991); Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 
F.2d 239, 24;~ (6th Cir. 1984); Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1240 (7th 
Cir. 1984). 
16. Berry, 900 F.2d at 1506-07. 
17. ld. at 1507. 
lR. ld. 
19. ld. at 150:~. 
20. ld. at 1506-07. 
21. RobertRon v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. fi84, 590 (1978); see Moor v. County of 
Alameda, 411 U.S. 69:1, 703 (1973). 
22. Berry, 900 F.2d at lfiO;~; Robertson, 436 U.S. at 590, 591; see also Carey v. 
Piphus, 4:i5 U.S. 247, 254 (197R). 
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limited recovery, possibly only damages to property loss, of 
which there were none, and loss of decedent's earnings between 
the time of injury and death, of which there also were none."23 
Thus, the Tenth Circuit found that the Oklahoma survival 
statute was deficient in its "remedy and deterrent effect."24 
The Tenth Circuit then considered whether the trial court 
was correct in applying Oklahoma's wrongful death statute.25 
The court found that although applying the state wrongful 
death statute in this case would meet the purposes of § 1983, 
other state statutes might not be adequate.26 The Court 
feared that applying the state law in this case would lead to a 
defeat of § 1983's purposes in future cases.27 The Tenth Cir-
cuit rejected an award of damages under Oklahoma's wrongful 
death statute, reasoning that to do otherwise leaves the issue 
of damages and survival in § 1983 cases entirely in the hands 
of the states.28 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit reasoned, federal 
damages must be created.29 The court decided the damages 
that would apply would be punitive and compensatory, includ-
ing "medical and burial expenses, pain and suffering before 
death, loss of earnings based upon the probable duration of the 
victim's life had not the injury occurred, the victim's loss of 
consortium, and other damages recognized in common law tort 
actions."30 
III. SURVIVABILITY OF A§ 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIM 
The federal courts have generally followed § 1988's three 
step process and applied state law when survivability becomes 
an issue in § 1983 civil rights claims. This generally leads to 
three results: 1) the courts find that the statute allows surviv-
al, or 2) the courts find the statute does not allow survival, but 
is consistent with federal law, or 3) the courts find the statute 
does not allow survival and is inconsistent with federal law. 
23. Berry, 900 F.2d at lii04. 
24. !d. 
2ii. !d. 
26. !d. Additionally, the Tenth Circuit found that wrongful death damages were 
not a new action under Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973) because 
applying the wrongful death statute would simply be assisting in the remedial 
purposes of § 19R3. Berry, 900 F.2d at lii04-0ii. 
27. Berry, 900 F.2d at lii06. 
2R. !d. at lii06. 
29. !d. at lii06-07. 
:~o. !d. at lii07. 
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A. Courts Finding That State Law Allowed Survival of 
§ 1983 Claims 
87 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in 
Brazier v. Cherry,31 applied § 1988's three step process and 
looked to Georgia's survival statute.32 In Brazier the 
defendant's police officers allegedly beat the decedent to death 
after wrongfully arresting him.33 The decedent's widow 
brought suit as administratrix of decedent's estate.34 The 
court of appeals reversed the district court's dismissal and 
explained that, although according to the common law claims 
for injury to the person die with the victim, "amelioration of 
the harshness of this principle must come from legislation."35 
The court, pursuant to § 1988, applied Georgia's survival stat-
ute and held that the civil rights claim survived.36 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit found that California's sur-
vival statute allowed the survival of civil rights claims in Smith 
v. City of Fontana. 37 Following§ 1988's three step process, the 
court applied the state law which the court interpreted to allow 
the survival of a § 1983 civil rights claim.38 
B. Courts Finding that State Statutes which Prohibit 
Survival of§ 1983 Claims are Consistent with Federal Law 
The United States Supreme Court in Robertson v. 
Wegmann39 addressed the survival issue, and concluded that 
the survival of § 1983 claims was not imperative. In Robertson, 
the plaintiff brought a civil rights claim under § 1983,40 but 
died before the case went to trial.41 The district court denied 
defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that the action abated on 
plaintiffs death.42 The district court reasoned that following § 
31. 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961). 
32. ld. at 407 (citing GA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-505, 105-1302 (Michie Supp. 1958)). 
33. Brazier, 293 F.2d at 402. 
34. ld. 
35. ld. at 403. 
36. !d. at 407. 
37. 818 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing CAL. PROB. CODE § 573 (West Supp. 
1986)). 
38. ld. at 1416. 
39. 486 U.S. 584 (1978). 
40. ld. at 586. 
41. ld. 
42. ld. at 587. Louisiana law allowed an action like decedents to survive only 
in favor of a spouse, children, parents, or siblings of which the decedent had none. 
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1988's three-step process and applying Louisiana's survival 
statute would lead to the abatement of plaintiffs civil rights 
claim which would be inconsistent with the purposes of § 
1983.43 Thus, the district court created "a federal common law 
of survival in civil rights actions in favor of the personal repre-
sentative of the deceased."44 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that ap-
plying Louisiana law would cause the action to abate which 
would be inconsistent with § 1983's purposes.45 The Fifth Cir-
cuit reasoned that a federal law of survival would advance the 
§ 1983 policies and provide uniformity in the application of civil 
rights laws.46 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and re-
versed.47 
The Supreme Court first outlined the principles which 
govern the survival of a § 1983 civil rights claim. Those princi-
ples include § 1988's three step process,48 which as explained 
above are: 1) look at the federal law; 2) if the federal law is 
deficient look to the state law wherein the suit is brought; and 
3) the state law cannot contradict federal law. The Supreme 
Court recognized that federal law does not cover the survival of 
a § 1983 civil rights claim, and thus, application of state law is 
appropriate so long as the state law is not inconsistent with 
federal law or the purposes of federallaw.49 
Applying these general principles Justice Marshall writing 
for the majority concluded that, "[d]espite the broad sweep of§ 
1983, we can find nothing in the statute or its underlying poli-
cies to indicate that a state law causing abatement of a particu-
lar action should invariably be ignored in favor of a rule of 
absolute survivorship."50 The Court supported this conclusion 
reasoning that Louisiana's statute is not inconsistent with the 
compensation and deterrence policies of§ 1983.51 The policy of 
compensating the decedent for violation of his civil rights is 
tA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 281fi (West 1971). 
48. Robertson, 486 U.S. at fiH7. 
44. !d. (quoting Shaw v. Garrison, 891 F. Supp. 18fi:c!, l:-l6H (E.D. La. 197fi) 
affd, fi4fi F.2d 9HO (fith Cir. 1977), n•hf.r denied, fififi F.2d 1:191, cert. pranted and 
rev'd by Robertson v. Wegmann, 486 U.S. fi04 (1978)). 
4fi. !d. at fiH7-R 
46. !d. at fiHH. 
47. 4:14 U.S. 91-1;~ (1977). 
48. !d. 
49. !d. at fii-19-90. 
fiO. !d. at fi90. 
fil. !d. 
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moot because the decedent is dead. Justice Marshall stated 
that "[ t]he goal of compensating those injured by a deprivation 
of rights provides no basis for requiring compensation of one 
who is merely suing as the executor of the deceased's es-
tate."52 
As for the policy of deterrence, the Supreme Court ruled 
that, given the amount and types of claims which do survive 
under Louisiana law, there is little reason to think officials will 
not be deterred from violating § 1983 at least when there is no 
claim that the illegal conduct caused death. 53 In response to 
the plaintiffs concern that § 1983 is a unique federal remedy, 
the Supreme Court stated that, 
[because] a federal remedy should be available, however, does 
not mean that a § 1983 plaintiff ... must be allowed to con-
tinue an action in disregard of the state law to which § 1988 
refers us. A state statute cannot be considered "inconsistent" 
with federal law merely because the statute causes the plain-
tiff to lose the litigation.54 
While the Court left open the question of whether or not a 
civil rights claim survived when the act giving rise to the cause 
of action was also the cause of death, the Court was unequivo-
cal in its assertion that § 1988 should be implemented and 
abatement alone did not justify ignoring the state law. 55 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
followed the Supreme Court in Parkerson v. Carrouth,56 and 
found that the Arkansas survival statute did not permit the 
survival of § 1983 claims.57 In Parkerson, the decedent died 
after filing a § 1983 claim against the defendants. 58 The cause 
of death was unrelated to the § 1983 claim. The Eighth Circuit 
reasoned that the compensation and deterence policies of § 
52. RobPrtson, 4::!6 U.S. at .'i92(footnote ommitted); see Parkerson v. Carrouth, 
7R2 F.2d 1449, 1455 (8th Cir. 1986); Bowling v. Oldham, 758 F. Supp. fi88, 590 
(M.D.N.C. 1990); Jones v. George, fi8:l F. Supp. 1293, 130fi (S.D.W. Va. 1982); 
Ascani v. Hughes, 470 So.2d 207, 211 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1001 
(19R5). 
53. Robertson, 486 U.S. at 591-2 (citing LA. C!V. CODE ANN. art. 231fi (West 
1971) which provides for the survival of most actions including defamation and 
malicious prosecution). 
54. Id. at 593. 
55. Id. at fi93-94. 
56. 782 F.2d 1449 (8th Cir. 1986). 
fi7. ld. at 14fi0 (interpreting ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-901 (Michie 1991)). 
58. ld. 
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1983 were met under Arkansas law.59 The court explained 
that persons violating § 1983 would have little reason to be-
lieve the plaintiff would die, and thus, abating the claim would 
not defeat § 1983's deterrence policies.60 
Other courts have applied the Supreme Court's analysis 
and held that § 1983 claims do not survive even when the act 
giving rise to the cause of action caused the death. In Jones v. 
George61 the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of West Virginia found that the plaintiffs civil rights 
claims on behalf of the decedent did not survive under West 
Virginia's survival statute.62 
Upon so finding the district court considered whether or 
not this statute was inconsistent with federal law. The Court in 
Jones found that abatement when a civil rights action has 
caused death would, in general, defeat the purposes of § 
1983.63 However, relying on Robertson and Carlson,64 the 
court reasoned that the claim should not survive if "the law 
applicable to viable claims joined with the personal injury 
claims satisfies that philosophy and those policies as they apply 
to the personal injury claims."65 The district court in Jones 
found that West Virginia's wrongful death law "suffice[s] to 
meet the § 1983 'deterrence of official misconduct' policy .... 
The potential damages in a West Virginia wrongful death ac-
tion are broad by category and notably include punitive dam-
ages."66 Therefore, the district court resolved 
the question of "whether abatement based on state law could 
be allowed in a situation in which deprivation of federal 
rights caused death" [citation omitted] as "yes" in situations 
like the instant one, in which wrongful death claims are also 
pleaded and where the state law covering such claims is not, 
as analyzed and found herein, "inconsistent with the constitu-
tion and laws of the United States."67 
fi9. ld. at 1454-fi5. 
60. ld. at 14fi4. 
61. fi33 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D. W. Va. 1982). 
62. ld. at 1801 (citing W. VA. CODE § fifi-7-8a(a)). 
68. ld. at l::!Ofi-06. 
64. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
6fi. Jane~;, fi88 F. Supp. at 1304. 
66. ld. at 1:~05. 
67. Id. at 180fi-06 (quoting Robertson, 486 U.S. at fi94). 
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Similarly, the Louisiana Court of Appeals, in Ascani v. 
Hughes, found that under Louisiana law an estate could not 
bring a civil rights claim and held that Louisiana's wrongful 
death statute satisfied § 1983's deterrence policy.68 Thus, the 
court in Ascani reasoned that applying state law to the 
abatement of plaintiffs § 1983 claim did not defeat § 1983's 
policies. 69 
C. Courts Finding that State Statutes which Prohibit 
Survival are Inconsistent with Federal Law. 
In Bell v. Milwaukee,10 the Seventh Circuit found that 
because the state law would not permit the plaintiffs § 1983 
claim to survive, the law was inconsistent with the policies of§ 
1983.71 Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded that in order "to 
deter officials from committing violations of constitutional 
rights that result in death of the victim . . . [the decedent's 
estate] has a § 1983 claim for loss of life notwithstanding in-
hospitable Wisconsin law.'172 
Similarly, in Jaco v. Bloechle,73 the Sixth Circuit found 
that Ohio's survival statute does not permit the survival of the 
decedents civil rights action when death was instantaneous. 74 
The court then concluded that this statute was inconsistent 
with the deterrent purposes of § 1983.75 Therefore, the court 
decided to "implement congressional intent by allowing surviv-
al."76 
The above cases exemplify three possible outcomes when 
applying § 1988. Regardless of the accuracy of the courts' inter-
pretations of the state law in these cases, or others coming to 
similar conclusions, the courts do attempt to follow the proce-
dure outlined in § 1988. While the Tenth Circuit in Berry 
68. 470 So. 2d 207, 210 (La. Ct. App. 19Rfi). 
69. !d. at 211; see Bowling v. Oldham, 7fi3 F. Supp. fiRR (M.D.N.C. 1990) (re· 
fusing to follow Berry, holding that in a § 19R3 suit North Carolina's wrongful 
death statute provides adequate relief for the estate of the deceased, and finding 
that the policy of preventing abuses of power by state officials is satisfied by the 
availability of punitive damages). 
70. 7411 F.2d 120fi (7th Cir. 19R4). 
71. !d. at 1236. 
72. !d. at 12::lR. 
78. 7:19 F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 19R4). 
74. Jacu, 7:19 F.2d at 242 (citing OHIO REV. CoDE ANN. § 2805.216 (Anderson 
1981)). 
75. !d. at 244. 
76. !d. at 244-fi. 
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reached the same conclusion as some of those mentioned above, 
the Tenth Circuit did not follow the same process. The Tenth 
Circuit found that the Oklahoma survival statute supplement-
ed with the Oklahoma wrongful death statute would meet the 
purposes of § 1983.77 However, the court reasoned that be-
cause the § 1988 procedure might occasionally lead to non-
survival or inconsistent results, the court should, in the inter-
est of uniformity, create a standard survival action with specif-
ic damages. 7x 
IV. THE TENTH CIRCUIT IN Berry v. City of Muskogee 
CONTRADICTS FEDERAL LAW AND PRIOR 
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
A. The Tenth Circuit Contradicts Federal Law 
The Tenth Circuit in Berry contradicts the United States 
Supreme Court and federal law. The Tenth Circuit reasoned 
that: 
In considering whether the purposes of§ 1983 are satisfied by 
adoption of state survival and wrongful death actions, we 
must consider that different states will define them different-
ly, thus requiring individual analyses of each state's law. We 
might have to find that a state's law works satisfactorily in 
some instances, as when there are surviving dependents, but 
not in other cases, as when there is no one with a right to 
sue.79 
Thus, the Tenth Circuit hypothesized that in some instances 
state law might be insufficient to satisfy the purposes of § 
1983, and because of that possibility concluded that "the feder-
al courts must fashion a federal remedy to be applied to § 1983 
death cases."80 This remedy included the survivability of § 
1983 claims and a list of damages available under§ 1983.81 
The Tenth Circuit ostensibly adopts the three step process 
of § 1988 concluding that Oklahoma's survival statute supple-
mented by Oklahoma's wrongful death statute would allow the 
survival of the § 1983 claim in Oklahoma and meet § 1983 
policies. The court stated "[ w ]e believe that the 'new' cause of 
77. Berry, 900 F.2d at 1fi06. 
7H. ld. at 1506-07. 
79. Berry. 900 F.2d at 1fi06. 
80. ld. 
81. ld. at 1506-07. 
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action theory [i.e., § 1983 as applied by the Tenth Circuit,] 
would not warrant rejection of state wrongful death remedies 
as appropriate to vindicate § 1983 violations when death re-
sults."82 Therefore, unlike the courts in Jaco and Bell, the 
Tenth Circuit did not find that state law contradicted federal 
law.83 However, the Tenth Circuit, reasoned that other states 
might not have amenable laws and therefore uniformity in 
result would be impossible.84 Thus, unlike the courts in Rob-
ertson, Parkerson and Jones, the Tenth Circuit did not apply 
the state law as § 1988 requires.85 The court simply bypassed 
that aspect of* 1988 and under the banner of uniformity creat-
ed a survival claim and federal damages to accompany civil 
rights claims. 86 
Uniformity should not override the dictates of§ 1988. The 
United States Supreme Court, in referring to the survivability 
of§ 1983 actions, has stated that states have an interest in the 
civil liability of their officials, and thus, deference should be 
paid to the state laws when enforcing § 1983 claims.87 The 
Tenth Circuit fails to realize that while there is a lack of uni-
formity in result, the correct application of § 1988 leads to 
uniformity in procedure.88 Congress in passing § 1988 has de-
termined that uniformity in procedure and state deference are 
to take priority over uniformity of result. The Tenth Circuit 
clearly ignored this congressional preference. 
In creating a "federal remedy to be applied to § 1983 death 
cases,"89 the Tenth Circuit oversteps "the function of the judi-
ciary into the domain of the legislature."9° Chief Justice 
Rehnquist has stated, "absent a clear indication from Congress, 
federal courts lack the authority to grant damages relief for 
constitutional violations."91 The courts cannot create common-
R2. ld. at 1fi0fi. 
83. See supra part III.C. 
R4. Berry, 900 F.2d at 1fi06 (stating that the "[a]pplication of state law, at 
least in some instances, will be inconsistent with the predominance of the federal 
interest"). 
R5. See supra part III.B. 
86. Berry, 900 F.2d at 1506·07. 
R7. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, n.ll (1980). 
Rl:l. Bowling v. Oldham, 7.'i.'3 F. Supp. Fi88, Fi91 (M.D.N.C. 1990). 
R9. Berry, 900 F.2d at 1.'i06. 
90. Bowling v. Oldham, 7.'i3 F. Supp . .'i88, 591 (M.D.N.C. 1990) (specifically 
rejecting Gilmere, Jaco and Berry). 
91. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 41 (1980) (Justice Rehnquist dissenting 
opinion). 
94 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 7 
law rights or federal common law.92 The Tenth Circuit's cre-
ation of a federal survival action and damages for § 1983 cases 
amends § 1988 and usurps legislative authority. 
The Tenth Circuit relied on Smith v. Wade93 and Mem-
phis Community School District v. Stachura94 as a basis for 
creating federal common law for § 1983 actions.95 The Court, 
in Smith and Stachura did not create new law. It simply ap-
plied the federal common law applicable when § 1983 was 
passed in 1871, "with such modification or adaptation as might 
be necessary to carry out the purpose and policy of[§ 1983]."96 
In essence, the Supreme Court in these cases never got past 
the first prong of§ 1988 in applying federal law. Certainly, the 
Supreme Court's modification of existing common law is distin-
guishable from the Tenth Circuit's creation of new common 
law. 
B. The Tenth Circuit Contradicts the United States 
Supreme Court 
The Tenth Circuit, by ruling that a state law can never 
cause a § 1983 claim to abate, contradicts the United States 
Supreme Court. The Tenth Circuit explains that if courts apply 
state survival statutes the courts may "have to find that a 
state's law works in some instances, as when there are sur-
viving dependents, but not in other cases, as when there is no 
one with the right to sue."97 Yet, the Supreme Court has 
found that a state survival statute should be applied pursuant 
to § 1988 even when the result is abatement.98 The Supreme 
Court has said that "[d]espite the broad sweep of § 1983, we 
can find nothing in the statute or its underlying policies to 
indicate that a state law causing abatement of a particular 
action should invariably be ignored in favor of a rule of abso-
lute survivorship."99 Additionally, the Supreme Court ex-
plained that, 
92. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, an U.S. 647, 6fi1 (1968); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 
:304 U.S. 64 (198R); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1Rfi0). 
93. 461 U.S. :m (19R8). 
94. 4 77 U.S. 299 (1986). 
9fi. Berry, 900 F.2d at lfi06. 
96. Smith, 461 U.S. at :14. 
97. ld. at lfi06. 
9R. Robertson v. Wegmann, 4:36 U.S. fiR4, 591-92 (197R). 
99. ld. at fi90. 
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[simply because] a federal remedy should be available, howev-
er, does not mean that a § 1983 plaintiff (or his representa-
tive) must be allowed to continue an action in disregard of the 
state law to which § 1988 refers us. A state statute cannot be 
considered "inconsistent" with federal law merely because the 
statute causes the plaintiff to lose the litigation. If the success 
of the § 1983 action were the only benchmark, there would be 
no reason at all to look to state law .... 100 
95 
While the Court was careful to distinguish this action, in which 
the decedent's death was unrelated to the civil rights violation, 
from one in which the decedent's death was caused by the civil 
rights violation, clearly the language of the Supreme Court 
leans toward a more rigid application of§ 1988 than the Tenth 
Circuit applied in Berry. 
The Tenth Circuit also contradicts the Supreme Court by 
finding that § 1983 is a survival action. The Tenth Circuit 
relied upon § 1983's direction that relief should go "to the party 
injured" to conclude that the action in Berry should be a surviv-
al action. 101 The Tenth Circuit does not explain how the 
phrase "to the party injured" creates a survival action or gives 
the deceased standing to sue. In fact, the Tenth Circuit's con-
clusion that this is a survival action contradicts the United 
States Supreme Court's finding in 1978 that "one specific area 
not covered by federal law is that relating to 'the survival of 
civil rights actions under § 1983 upon the death of either the 
plaintiff or defendant."102 A more reasonable interpretation of 
the phrase "to the party injured" is that whatever action is 
available, whether survival or wrongful death, it is only avail-
able to the "party injured." It appears that the federal law is 
deficient as to just what type of claim this is, and therefore, 
following § 1988's second step, the court should look to the 
state statute. 
In Berry, under Oklahoma's statute, a decedent's civil 
rights claims do not survive his death. Oklahoma law states 
that only those actions which survive at common law and 
"causes of actions for mesne profits, or for an injury to the 
person, or to real or personal estate, or for any deceit or fraud, 
100. Id. at fi93. 
101. Berry, 900 F.2d at 1506-07; see supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
102. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) (quoting Moor v. County 
of Alameda, 411 U.S. 692, 702 n.14 (1973)). 
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shall also survive; and the action may be brought, notwith-
standing the death of the person entitled or liable to the 
same."103 At least one court has held that, applying § 1988's 
three step approach, a civil rights action would not survive in 
Oklahoma. 104 In Black v. Cook105 the United States District 
Court for the Westem District of Oklahoma held that since the 
Oklahoma statute goveming survival and abatement of actions 
does not provide for the survival of an action to recover damag-
es for violation of a decedent's civil rights, the plaintiffs lack 
standing to sue for the alleged violation of their son's civil 
rights even though their son died as a result of the viola-
tion.106 
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in other cases 
would seem to forbid the survival of civil rights actions under 
Oklahoma law. The Tenth Circuit has held that because libel, 
slander, defamation and invasion of privacy actions did not 
survive at common law and were not specifically mentioned 
under New Mexico's survival statute which contains wording 
similar to Oklahoma's, such claims did not survive. 107 By 
analogy, a civil rights action does not survive at common law 
and is not mentioned in Oklahoma's survival statute, thus a 
civil rights action should not survive. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Tenth Circuit in Berry has created a survival action 
and specific damages in § 1983 civil rights claims. This judicial 
creation contradicts federal law and the Supreme Court. While 
the Tenth Circuit's results in Berry may be desirable, the 
means with which the Tenth Circuit obtained their results un-
dermines both the legislative process and representative gov-
ernment. Extending the Tenth Circuit's analysis, a Court could 
easily create any amendment to any statute simply by finding 
that in some cases, though not the one at bar, the outcome 
might contradict the statute's purposes. On a practical level 
overturning Berry would allow courts to apply§ 1988 appropri-
ately, giving states some control over the financial liability of 
108. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § lOfil (West 1984). 
104. Black v. Cook, 444 F. Supp. 61 (W.D. Okla. 1977). 
lOfi. 444 F. Supp. 61 (D. Okla. 1977). 
106. ld. 
107. Gruschus v. Curtis Publishing Co., :342 F.2d 77fi, 776 (lOth Cir. 196fi) (cit-
ing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-7-1 (now N.M. STAT. ANN. § 87-2-1 (Michie 1978))). 
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their officials. 108 On a larger, and perhaps more important 
level, overturning Berry would restore meaning and representa-
tion to the legislative process. 
Ned S. Fuller 
108. Moreover, overturning Berry would not necessarily mean that plaintiffs have 
no claim for relief in cases in which the § 1988 action does not survive the 
victim's death. Plaintiffs would still be entitled to sue in most states, under com-
mon law or statutory tort actions. However, plaintiffs would lose the generous 
attorney fee advantage allocated them under § l9R8. 
